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Keeping customers' data secure: A cross-cultural study of cybersecurity compliance among the Gen-
Mobile workforce 
Abstract 
Employees are increasingly relying on mobile devices. In international organizations, more employees are 
using their personal smartphones for work purposes. Meanwhile, the number of data breaches is rising and 
affecting the security of customers’ data. However, employees’ cybersecurity compliance with cybersecurity 
policies is poorly understood. Researchers have called for a more holistic approach to information security. 
We propose an employee smartphone-security compliance (ESSC) model, which deepens understanding of 
employees’ information-security behavior by considering influences on the national, organizational, 
technological (smartphone-specific), and personal levels. The research focuses on secure smartphone use in 
the workplace among Gen-Mobile (aged 18-35) employees in a cross-cultural context: the United Kingdom 
(UK), United States (US) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) where 1,735 questionnaires were collected. Our 
findings suggest that those who wish to understand employees’ smartphone-security behavior should 
consider national cybersecurity policies, cultural differences in different countries, and threats specific to 
smartphone use. In addition, our findings help companies to increase customers’ trust and maintain a positive 
reputation.  
Keywords: Customer data; smartphone security; employee cybersecurity compliance; cross-cultural 
information security  
1. Introduction 
The growth of this mobile workforce is driven by technological change, globalization, and changes in 
employees’ expectations. These employees prefer mobility in terms of the devices they use and their approach 
to work. The benefits of using technology, more specifically, smartphones at work include faster innovation, 
flexible work opportunities, higher-quality work, and better collaboration and communication across borders 
(Kshetri, 2015; British Telecom, 2018; Frost & Sullivan, 2016; Prud'Homme & von Zedtwitz, 2019). 
However, managing the security of data in these devices remains a challenge. Employees can use their 
personal smartphones to access different work-related applications for example: corporate mobile 
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applications, company and employee contact details, and mobile dashboards. They can also download 
business documents on their smartphones. This makes smartphone security an even more pressing issue. 
Previous reports have identified that smartphone security can be compromised by different threats: loss of 
the device, the operating system (Android or Apple iOS), insecure networks, weak authentication processes, 
poor data-protection, insufficient privacy, viruses, malware, and SMS-based attacks (McAfee, 2018). Losing 
critical company data, especially relating to customers, is a major concern for most organizations (European 
Commission, 2017).  
Smartphones are the most widely used devices for work (Global Web Index, 2017) and personal purposes. 
As their prevalence has increased, smartphones have become more prone to cyberattacks and they are 
associated with a higher level of security risk. Meanwhile, increasing numbers of companies are adopting the 
bring your own device (BYOD) model, which involves “employees bringing their personally owned mobile 
devices such as laptops, tablets, and smartphones to the workplace, and using those devices to access 
privileged company information and applications” (Tu, Adkins & Zhao, 2018, p. 1). In many countries, the 
workforce has gone mobile (Spokephone, 2018), performing their professional duties using their 
smartphones or tablets. Generation-mobile (Gen-Mobile) employees, most of whom are at the early stages 
of their career, are shaping their working lives around their mobile devices. The global mobile workforce is 
set to increase from 1.45 billion in 2016, accounting for 38.8 percent of the global workforce, to 1.87 billion 
in 2022, accounting for 42.5 percent of the global workforce (Strategy Analytics, 2016).  
International organizations whose employees use mobile devices are exposed to vulnerabilities that could be 
highly disruptive for their businesses. According to a recent global survey of security professionals 
(Dimensional Research, 2017, p.2), 64 percent of participants doubt that their organization could prevent a 
mobile cyberattack, 94 percent expect the frequency of mobile cyberattacks to increase, 32 percent of 
organizations fail to secure mobile devices adequately, and 79 percent believe that it is becoming more 
difficult to secure their mobile devices. More importantly, 56 percent of organizations think that regular 
employees who are trusted and authorized users pose the biggest security risk to their business (Cyber 
Security Insiders, 2018). Meanwhile, under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), companies 
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must report security breaches or face prosecution if they are based in the European Union (EU), have 
employees in the EU, or do business there. 
Tackling cybersecurity requires international efforts. The World Economic Forum revealed concerns over 
failure to tackle global threats to cybersecurity and stated that nations and governments across the globe have 
struggled to form information sharing channels with companies (World Economic Forum, 2018). 
Organizational cybersecurity will not improve unless nations begin working together and with their own 
technical security experts to improve their understanding of security problems and the tools used to fix them 
(Sheridan, 2018). Hence, there is a need for an international perspective when addressing cybersecurity issues 
in organizations (Bing, 2018). Recent statistics show that only less than half the companies in the USA are 
fully prepared to deal with cyberattacks (Palmer, 2019). Companies in the USA report have one of the highest 
total average cost of cybersecurity at US$21 million (Accenture, 2017). Furthermore, despite following the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the case is similar in the UK where recent statistics show that 
only 57% have a cyber incident response plan they test on a regular basis (Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport, 2019). Companies in the UK also report one of the highest total average cost of 
cybersecurity at US$9 million (Accenture, 2017). 
Most academic studies on employees’ information-security compliance have focused on the individual and 
organizational levels (e.g. Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Hu, Dinev, Hart & Cooke, 2012; Hwang & 
Cha, 2018; Janmaimool, 2017; Putri & Hovav, 2014; Salleh et al., 2012; Siponen, 2006; Tu & Yuan, 2015). 
More recently, a study conducted by Johnston, Di Gangi, Howard and Worrell (2019) investigated this 
phenomenon at the group level. A few studies have used the Hofstede cultural dimensions to consider effects 
of culture at the national level on employee information-security compliance (e.g. Arage, Belanger & 
Tesema, 2016; Connolly, Lang & Tygar, 2014). Herrera, Ron and Rabadão (2017) have highlighted the 
general impact of national cybersecurity policies. However, no studies have explored the effects of national 
cybersecurity policies and technology-specific threats on employees’ information-security behavior. Further, 
the need for a more holistic approach to information security has been highlighted in recent literature 
(Soomro, Shah & Ahmed, 2016).  
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Managing teams in different countries is a major challenge for global companies (Singh, 2010). This is due 
to national differences in political, economic, social, and regulatory factors (Brewster, Chung & Sparrow, 
2016). By influencing employees’ behavior, national laws on mobile cybersecurity may play a significant 
role in reducing breaches of company data through a mobile device. However, this area remains unexplored 
in the prior studies. Hence, this research investigates the effects of national cybersecurity policies and security 
threats that are specific to smartphones on employees’ smartphone-security compliance. In doing so, it 
proposes a more holistic model that considers national, organizational, technological (smartphone-specific) 
and personal factors to understand employees’ information-security behavior.  
The proposed model combines three theories that apply to employees’ information-security behavior: 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1983), general deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1963; Gibbs, 1975), and 
the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The model integrates national cybersecurity policies 
and technological (security threats specific to smartphone technology). Our research contributes a more 
holistic understanding of how national cybersecurity policies and security threats specific to smartphone 
technology influence employee information-security compliance in international organizations that have 
adopted the BYOD model. In addition, it raises awareness of the need to include these factors within 
strategies for information security. 
We focus on BYOD (specifically smartphone) security among Gen-Mobile employees aged 18-35 in the 
United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These three countries 
have different characteristics. According to the Global Cyber-Security Index provided by the International 
Telecommunication Union (2018), the UK is ranked first in terms of commitment to cybersecurity, the US 
is ranked second, and the UAE is ranked thirty-third. Despite this gap, the UAE is one of the most 
technologically advanced countries in the Middle East. In addition, it has close business ties with both the 
US and the UK, which are tech leaders in comparison with other markets. Economic, cultural, and regulatory 
factors also differ among the three countries. It is a wealthy country that has direct trade relations with other 
regions in the world, including Europe. For example, the UAE is the UK’s largest export market in the Middle 
East, a market that has been under researched in terms of management systems and leadership styles 
(Karacay, Bayraktar, Kabasakal & Dastmalchian, 2019). The number of global companies with teams 
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operating in different countries is increasing rapidly. Hence, it is important to investigate whether there are 
differences in employees’ cybersecurity compliance in different countries and cultures. Therefore, focusing 
on these countries provides academics and practitioners with in-depth insights into employee behavior in 
different countries. Thus, we also respond to the call for improving the quality of cross-cultural research 
beyond Hofstede and GLOBE (Tung & Vebeke, 2010). 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section two gives an overview of security issues related 
to BYOD. Theoretical background is discussed in section three. Research model is presented and hypotheses 
are developed in section four.  Section five describes research methodology.  Section six describes the process 
of data collection and the results are interpreted in the same section. Section seven is dedicated for discussion. 
Theoretical and practical contributions are elaborated in section eight. Limitations and directions for future 
research are given in section nine. Last, study findings are summarized in the conclusion section. 
2. BYOD Security 
Under the GDPR, companies that operate in the EU must follow a set of laws on data protection. If a data 
breach is identified, the company must report it within 72 hours to the data protection authority in their 
country (Jaques, 2017). That authority then decides how much to fine the organization for the breach. This 
could be up to four percent of the organization’s global annual turnover or EUR20 million, whichever is 
highest (Jaques, 2017). BYOD security practices covered by the GDPR include controlling data storage, 
limiting data transfers, emphasizing security (including restricting the installation of third-party mobile 
applications), and increasing employee privacy (Hanna, 2018). The GDPR applies to companies that operate 
in Europe or that deal directly with customers in Europe. However, it also has implications for global 
organizations when employees from European countries are connected using a technological medium, such 
as a mobile application installed on the employee’s smartphone.  
The existing literature fails to account for the external environment (specifically, national cybersecurity 
policies), which can have a significant effect on how employees use their personal devices—both inside and 
outside their companies. In addition, despite recognition that it is important to assess employees’ awareness 
of the specific security threats posed by the BYOD model, the existing literature has not considered this 
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phenomenon or integrated these threats into BYOD security models. Table 1 sets out the findings of recent 
studies (up to January 2019) on employees’ BYOD security behavior. 
 
Table 1. Studies on BYOD security behavior  
Author Context Methodology  Findings  
Putri and 
Hovav (2014) 
Focuses on the factors 
affecting the adoption of 
BYOD at work, but 
integrates two factors 
related to security. 
Combines reactance, 
organizational justice, and 
protection motivation 
theory. 




230 usable responses 
from employees in 
Indonesia.  
While protection motivation theory 
partially enhances compliance, 
perceived loss of freedom reduces 
intention to comply with an 
organization’s BYOD information-
security policy. Similarly, 






Focuses on smartphone 
security among employees. 
Adapts an awareness 
model from the domain of 
accident prevention. 
Carried out an expert 
review of the model. 
Seven responses were 
received. 
Smartphone-security awareness 
depends on smartphone productivity 
levels, the pressure applied on 
employees to increase the amount of 
effort required to perform work 
using smartphone devices, and 
pressure from policies. 
de las Cuevas 
et al. (2015) 
Proposes an adaptive and 
free software system to 
manage security in BYOD 
environments: the multi-
platform usable endpoint 




The MUSES system focuses on 
creating technology that accounts for 
user behavior and security.  
Al Askar & 
Shen (2016) 
Focuses on five main 
contextual factors: device 
ownership, place, time, 
activity/task, and 
sensitivity.  
The research was 
theoretical and no 
empirical work was 
conducted 
The literature has failed to accurately 
identify the contextual factors that 
can affect employees’ BYOD 
security behavior. 
Wang et al. 
(2017) 
Extends the unified theory 
of acceptance and use of 
technology (UTAUT) to 
include threats to business 
security and private 
security.  




data from the US, 
China, and Germany. 
Included 302 usable 
responses in the 
analysis.  
Performance expectancy, effort 
expectancy, and perceived threat 
have a significant influence on 
behavioral intention to use BYOD 




Integrates factors related to 
artifact ecologies: personal 





with 36 mobile 
knowledge workers 
from North Carolina's 
Research Triangle.  
The findings highlight the 
significance of the artifact ecology 
that embodies various social and 
contextual forces that shape the 
engagement of mobile workers with 
a broad diversity of personal 
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multitude of technologies, 
and work activities.  
computing tools, as well as 







A theoretical analysis of 
reversed IT adoption logic 
vs traditional IT adoption 
logic. 
The work was 
theoretical, and no 
empirical work was 
conducted.  
Employees enjoy the personal 
advantages of using their own 
device, but this comes with more 
threats to the security of personal 
data. 
Cho and Ip 
(2018) 
Uses technology threat 
avoidance theory to study 
BYOD security in 
organizations.  




450 usable responses 
in the analysis. 
Perceived cost and protection of 
privacy has no significant effect on 
employees’ intention to adopt 
BYOD, while organizational 
commitment and job security have 
the strongest influences on that 
intention. 
Tu et al. 
(2018) 
Extends protection 
motivation theory by 
integrating moderating 
factors related to mixed 
use and surveillance 
visibility.  




122 usable responses 
in the analysis.  
Employees’ intention to comply is 
motivated by perceived effectiveness 
when the device is used for personal 





motivation theory in the 
context of BYOD security.  




526 usable responses 
in the analysis. 
Coping appraisal is more predictive 
of security behaviors than threat 
appraisal. Response costs may be a 
barrier to behavior, but response 




Identifies risks associated 
with adopting BYOD. 
Analyzed the 
literature on BYOD 
risks. 
Identifies 50 types of risk that may 
arise if an organization adopts a 
BYOD program. The key risks are 





Combines the job 
demands-resources (JD-R) 
model and the task-
technology fit (TTF) 
model. 





Included 400 usable 
responses in the 
analysis.  
BYOD indirectly affects job 
satisfaction, job performance, 
organizational commitment, job 
demands (perceived workload), job 
resources (perceived job autonomy), 
and TTF.  
 
As shown in Table 1, previous studies have investigated BYOD, in particular; smartphone security among 
employees. However, none of these studies focus on the effects of national factors and the effects of the 
GDPR in a cross-cultural context. In addition, there is a lack of studies proposing a holistic model that 
accounts for national, organizational, technological (smartphone-specific) and personal factors which is 
needed for a deeper understanding of this behavior among the Gen-Mobile workforce. The studies in Table 
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1 mainly focused on personal and organizational factors rather than a careful integration of these types of 
factors with national and technological factors at a cross-cultural level. Because international organizations 
have limited control over how employees use BYOD smartphones outside work in voluntary settings, they 
are at higher risk of a security breach. It is necessary to investigate the effects of different national 
cybersecurity policies on BYOD security in more depth. This is especially important for global companies 
because different national policies may result in different smartphone-security behavior among employees. 
Gen-Mobile employees use their mobile devices for personal and work purposes, but no studies have focused 
on this segment of the population. Hence, more research is needed for more information about the context 
within which BYOD security lies.  
3. Theoretical Background 
The literature is rich with theories that have been applied to the area of information-security management. 
However, only a few studies have investigated employees’ actual behavior in this context (Cram, Proudfoot 
& D’Arcy, 2017; Karlsson, Kolkowska & Prenkert, 2016; McCole, Ramsey & Williams 2010; Gozman & 
Willcocks, 2019; Amankwah-Amoah & Wang, 2019). Theories in the literature include protection motivation 
theory (Rogers, 1983), general deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1963; Gibbs, 1975), rational choice theory 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996), neutralization theory (Siponen & Vance, 2010; Sykes & Matza, 1957), theory 
of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) and social cognitive 
theory (Bandura, 1986). Table 2 provides, the factors integrated in each of these theories, and definitions of 
those factors. Table 3 shows the strengths and limitations of each theory.  
Neutralization theory, developed by Sykes and Matza (1957), originates in criminology, though it has been 
developed for use in other contexts (Siponen & Vance, 2010). In a nutshell, neutralization theory is about 
how individuals rationalize illicit behavior and turn off certain values in order to perform certain actions. The 
original theory describes five justifications that individuals use for their actions. Siponen and Vance (2010) 
incorporate four of these: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, appeal to higher loyalties, and 
condemnation of the condemners (Table 2). 
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Rational choice theory, developed by Paternoster and Simpson (1996), posits that the decision to engage in 
illicit behavior is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of the act (Simpson, 2002). In other words, 
an individual determines what action to take by balancing the costs and benefits of their options. It integrates 
five main factors: formal sanction, informal sanction, shame, perceived benefits, and moral beliefs (Simpson, 
2002; see Table 2). In contrast, protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975) explains how employees’ 
security behavior is motivated by the fear of loss that could occur due to a threat (Herath & Rao, 2009a; 
Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010). The theory integrates five main factors: perceived risk vulnerability, 
severity of the adverse consequences, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost (Rogers, 1975, 1983; 
see Table 2). It has been applied in the context of employees’ awareness of organizational information-
security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009a; Siponen et al., 2010) and individuals’ use of security software 
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).  
Adapted from criminal justice research, general deterrence theory is based on the concept of rational decision-
making (Beccaria, 1963; Gibbs, 1975). It proposes that as the certainty and severity of punishment increase, 
the level of unacceptable behavior decreases (Herath & Rao, 2009b). Rooted in classic criminology 
(Beccaria, 1963; Gibbs, 1975), the theory assumes that people make reasoned decisions about perpetrating 
or abstaining from crime, and that these decisions are based on maximizing their benefits and minimizing 
cost. From this perspective, when employees’ make decisions on whether or not to comply with information-
security policies they are influenced by their perceptions of the certainty and severity of the sanctions they 
may face, balancing the costs and benefits (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu & Benbasat, 2010; D’Arcy, Hovav & 
Galletta, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012).  
The theory of reasoned action was primarily developed to understand and predict human social behavior 
(decision-making). It was introduced by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). Because it provides insights on behavior, 
it is an important starting point for many of the theories and models of technology acceptance that extend it. 
The theory integrates three main factors: attitude, subjective norms, and behavioral intention (see Table 2). 
It was extended by Ajzen (1985) to form the theory of planned behavior, which integrates perceived 
behavioral control to account for the external environment that surrounds individuals. Recently, the theory 
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has been applied in the context of information-security management (Bauer, 2016; Kim, Yang & Park, 2014). 
Social cognitive theory has also been used to study information systems security. This theory is based on 
social learning theory, studied by Miller and Dollard (1941), in which three major elements for learning are 
identified: self-efficacy, environmental factors, and behavior modelling (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Factors found in previous employee security compliance theories  







Perceived risk vulnerability 
 
One’s perception of experiencing possible negative consequences of behaving in a risky way (Rogers, 1983; 
Salleh et al., 2012). 
Severity of the adverse 
consequences 
 
One’s perception of the level of damage that may result from engaging in a risky situation (Rogers, 1983; 




The degree to which one believes that their response will be effective in alleviating the threat (Rogers, 1983). 
Perceived self-efficacy 
 
Belief in one’s ability to perform a particular task (Rogers, 1983; Salleh et al., 2012). 
Response cost 
 








Perceived severity of 
sanctions  
How one perceives the severity of penalties for noncompliance. If the perceived severity is high, one’s 
intention to behave in an undesirable way is likely to decrease (Peace et al., 2003). 
Perceived certainty of 
sanctions  







choice theory  
Formal sanction Rules and laws that have penalties associated with the behavior (Arage et al., 2016). 
 
Informal sanction Disapproval of friends or peers in response to a given action (Arage et al., 2016; Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996). 
Shame Feelings of guilt or embarrassment about one’s socially undesirable actions (Arage et al., 2016; Eliason & 
Dodder 1999, as cited in Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Perceived benefits Intrinsic benefits, such as the internal satisfaction one gets from breaking a rule (Wood et al., 1997), and 
extrinsic benefits, such as money received for breaking a rule (Arage et al., 2016; Lafree et al., 2005). 







Denial of responsibility Not taking responsibility for one’s actions; seeing oneself as powerless to have acted in another way (Sykes & 
Matza, 1957). 
Denial of injury Rationalizing one’s own actions as being harmless and not causing any damage (Sykes & Matza, 1957). People 





Appeal to higher loyalties Justifying one’s actions as being necessary to get out of a problematic situation (Sykes & Matza, 1957) or as 
being for the greater good in the long term (Siegel, 2005). 
Condemnation of the 
condemners 
Justifying one’s actions by arguing that the rule against the action is unreasonable (Sykes & Matza, 1957). In 
the context of information-security policies, an employee could argue that they are justified in breaking a rule 
because it is counterproductive and a hindrance to work. 
Defense of necessity Justifying one’s actions by arguing that there was no other course of action to take. One does not feel guilt 











One’s belief that the behavior leads to certain outcomes, and one’s evaluations of those outcomes (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980). 
 
Subjective norms One’s belief that specific individuals or groups think that one should or should not behave in a certain way, and 
one’s motivation to comply with those norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
Intention One’s readiness (cognitively) to perform a certain behavior. Accordingly, the possibility of a person behaving 









When one believes that one has less control over a certain behavior (Ajzen, 1985; 1991). The perceived ease or 
difficulty of behaving in a certain way, and the sense of having the skills and resources to do so (Ajzen, 2005). 







Self-efficacy One’s perception of one’s capability to perform the behaviors (Bandura, 1986). 
Environmental factors The social norms and community (Bandura, 1986). 
Behavior modelling Knowledge or skills influencing behavior (Bandura, 1986). 
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Table 3. Strengths and limitations of existing theories  




 Effective for studying changes in 
human behavior through the use 
of fear (Shaw, 2012; van Bavel  
Rodríguez-Priego, Vila & Briggs, 
2019). 
 Does not consider environmental and 
cognitive factors such as social norms 
(El-Den & Dangi, 2016; Shaw, 2012; 




 Effective tool for preventing 
crime (El-Den & Dangi, 2016; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010) 
 Emphasizes the power of 
punishment to deter crime (El-
Den & Dangi, 2016; Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010). 
 Central assumption of the theory is that 
people are deterred from committing 
crime by the severity of the punishment 
(El-Den & Dangi, 2016; Tomlinson, 
2016). 
 Lacks a complete understanding of crime 




 Uses a deductive-based approach 
and allows for generality (El-Den 
& Dangi, 2016; Zafirovski, 
1999). 
 Makes it possible to treat 
variations in choices among 
actors or by an actor over time as 
a function of their structural 
position (El-Den & Dangi, 2016; 
Zafirovski, 1999). 
 
 Does not capture the complexity of 
human social actions and interactions 
(El-Den & Dangi, 2016; Paternoster & 
Bachman, 2001; Zafirovski, 1999). 
 Rejects the concept of social action as 
expressive, nonrational, or irrational, or 
as caused by external factors (El-Den & 
Dangi, 2016; Paternoster & Bachman, 
2001; Zafirovski, 1999). 
 Assumes that all choices made by 
humans are rational (El-Den & Dangi, 
2016; Paternoster & Bachman, 2001; 
Zafirovski, 1999). 
 Conceptualizes rational (and all) human 
action as simply utility- or profit-
optimizing behavior (El-Den & Dangi, 




 Makes it possible to understand 
criminals’ thought processes 
when justifying their behavior 
when committing crimes (Lanier 
& Henry, 2004; Siponen et al., 
2012). 
 Offenders may not be committed to 
conventional values and norms in the 
first place (Hamlin, 1988; Lanier & 
Henry, 2004). 
 There are problems with causality, 
particularly in establishing when the 
neutralizations occur (Hamlin, 1988; 




In the context of information-security management, none of the theories listed in Tables 3 and 4 include 
factors that are specific to the external environment (beyond the organizational context) and none of them 
consider the security threats that are specific to the technology being used. A recent systematic literature 
review by Soomro et al. (2016) explains that current research is mainly concerned with the role of 
management in organizational information security. The authors suggest taking a more holistic approach to 
studying information technology management in organizations by investigating not only participation from 
top managers and human resources managers but also the development and execution of information-security 
policies, training and awareness in information security, and the involvement of strategic decision-makers. 
Threats related to the type of technology under investigation are also important. International organizations 
are moving beyond using desk-based technologies, such as computers. Many now favor wireless 
technologies, such as iPads and smartphones, which integrate sophisticated software and provide more 
benefits (Putri & Hovav, 2014). These technologies have created new and unpredictable challenges for 
information security within organizations (Wandera, 2018a). Smartphones can pose a major security threat 
simply because they are used so extensively which make them a more attractive target for cybercrime. 




 Explains human behavior when 
interacting with technology 
(Ameen, 2017; Montaño & 
Kasprzyk, 2015). 
 Forms the basis of subsequent 
theories on human-computer 
interaction (Ameen, 2017; 
Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2015). 
 Does not account for external factors that 
can affect humans’ behavior (Ameen, 
2017; Silva & Dias, 2007). 
 Assumes that people behave in a rational 
way and that all actions are planned 




 Accounts for external factors 
during the decision- making 
process (Ajzen, 2002; Cho & 
Walton, 2009). 
 Overlooks emotional factors associated 
with individual actions, such as fear, 
danger, threat, and any positive feelings 





 Covers important aspects of 
human behavior and personal 
beliefs about one’s ability to 
behave in a certain way (Ameen, 
2017; Compeau & Higgins, 
1995). 
 Does not account for changes that may 
take place over a person’s life (El-Den & 
Dangi, 2016). 
 Not fully systematized (El-Den & Dangi, 
2016). 
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Examples of these features include mobility, device ownership (as the device is owned by the employee 
rather than the organization), the ability to connect to different networks, multiple sophisticated mobile 
applications integrated into one device, and dual use of the device for personal and professional purposes 
(Wandera, 2018a; Weber & Rudman, 2018).  
Recent studies have emphasized that national policies have a significant impact on how people intend to use, 
and actually use, smartphones (Ameen & Willis, 2018a; Ameen & Willis, 2018b; Ameen, Willis & Shah, 
2018). National policies on the secure use of smartphones and mobile applications can influence 
organizations’ policies on smartphone use. In turn, this influences how employees use smartphones for 
personal and professional purposes. We developed the employee smartphone-security compliance (ESSC) 
model proposed in this study by combining and extending three existing theories: protection motivation 
theory, general deterrence theory, and theory of reasoned action. We combined these theories for the four 
reasons. First, each theory has been used to study employees’ information-security behavior (Cram et al., 
2017). Second, when capturing the complexity of human social actions and interactions, these theories are 
more effective than other relevant theories, such as rational choice theory, neutralization theory, and social 
cognitive theory (El-Den & Dangi, 2016). Third, combining the three selected theories helps to overcome 
the limitations that apply when using them individually (see Table 3). Fourth, some of these theories have 
been used individually to study mobile security behavior in previous research. For example, Dang-Pham and 
Pittayachawan (2015) adopted the protection motivation theory to study individuals’ BYOD (mobile phones) 
security. The authors found that the theory serves the purpose of understanding students’ mobile security 
behavior. Similarly, the theory pf planned behavior has been adopted to study individuals’ mobile security 
behavior (Cho & Ip, 2018). Furthermore, Yang et al. (2019) explained that the general deterrence theory 
can be used to study employees’ security behavior. Hence, the integration of these three theories to study 
employees’ BYOD (smartphone) security behavior is justified.  
4. Research Model and Hypothesis Development 
We propose a new research model to understand how national cybersecurity policies and smartphone-specific 
security threats affect employees’ information-security compliance. The ESSC model draws on protection 
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motivation theory (Rogers, 1983), general deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1963; Gibbs, 1975), and theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). It groups factors into four categories: national, organizational, 
technological (smartphone-specific), and personal (see Figure 1). In this section we explain the factors 
included in each category and propose hypotheses for how they influence employees’ behavior.  
 
Figure 1. Proposed model 
4.1 National Factors 
4.1.1 National smartphone cybersecurity policies 
 
National cybersecurity policies and regulations assist organizations to minimize security breaches and deal 
with those that they do encounter. The policies and regulations in individual countries have implications for 
any global company whose workforce is active in that country (Herrera et al., 2017). However, research has 
not yet investigated the influence of national policies on organizations’ and employees’ secure use of 
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BYODs. Furthermore, the theories that have been applied to research on information-security management 
presume that the external (or environmental) factors that may affect employees’ cybersecurity behavior exist 
within the organization and are mainly related to the management (Soomro et al., 2016). Effective national 
cybersecurity policies influence company policy on BYOD. Since employees use these devices for personal 
purposes as well as at work, these national policies also affect how employees use smartphones outside the 
organization. Because different countries have different cybersecurity policies and they rank differently in 
the cybersecurity index, an employee’s smartphone security behavior may depend on the country they live 
and work in. For example, the GDPR is not followed in all countries around the world, and it does not apply 
equally to all BYOD users. National cybersecurity policies give consumers the power to protect their 
information and may affect how networks are protected. An inconsistent or unenforced set of national 
cybersecurity policies guarantees poor security (CTIA, 2018). Hence, national cybersecurity policies can 
create variance in employees’ smartphone-security compliance.  
The GDPR has a significant impact on mobile security in European countries (Hanna, 2018; Holland, 2018). 
For example, companies must ensure that they protect personal data, whether that data is kept on servers, in 
the cloud, in mobile applications, or on company-owned mobile devices (Holland, 2018). This EU regulation 
also affects employees in other countries, because it applies to any company that does business with or 
monitors EU residents (Holland, 2018). In other words, when multinational and global companies based in 
other parts of the world (including the US and the UAE) deal with or target people in the EU or have 
employees in the EU (Malone, 2018), they must follow the GDPR. Businesses in the US have been taking 
steps to ensure that they comply with the new regulation (Endpoint Protector, 2018). Not all data protection 
legislation in the US meets the standards of the GDPR (Endpoint Protector, 2018). Hence, national 
smartphone security policies can be an important factor affecting employees’ cybersecurity behavior.  
The GDPR requires companies to be in full control of their data at all times (Wandera, 2018a). This makes 
the BYOD model (including smartphones) challenging because full control is “near impossible when the 
controller does not own the device where the data is being accessed or stored” (Wandera, 2018b). More 
importantly, the GDPR does not account for human error, so organizations can be held liable for errors made 
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by their employees (Wandera, 2018b). As explained by Act Systems (2018), the GDPR addresses four key 
areas of mobile security that organizations need to consider:  
1. Information audits: Businesses need to know where all their data is and keep records of how 
and when a person gives the organization consent to store and use their personal information.  
2. Visibility: At all times, organizations need to see which devices and mobile applications are 
accessing business services. This includes employees’ personal devices.  
3. Device security threats: Organizations need to ensure that appropriate security configurations, 
encryptions, and protection policies have been applied to the device.  
4. Keeping personal and business data separate: Organizations need to set boundaries for 
employees on the overlap between personal and business smartphone use.  
Hence, organizations are under pressure to ensure that employees are aware of and can follow a set of clear 
policies. In turn, this can have a significant impact on how employees intend to behave (their behavioral 
intention) and how they actually behave in the context of smartphone-security compliance. Although the 
UAE has no data protection law that compares with the GDPR in Europe and the US, the UAE Constitution 
gives citizens a general right to privacy (Dowle, 2018). Policy-makers in the UAE acknowledge that 
companies should adhere to the GDPR if they are connected to the EU in any way (Dowle, 2018). Thus, we 
propose the following two hypotheses: 
H1. National smartphone cybersecurity policies affect employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-
security compliance.  
H2. National smartphone cybersecurity policies affect employees’ actual smartphone-security compliance. 
4.2 Organizational Factors 
4.2.1. Response cost 
By organizational factors, we refer to the support that an organization provides to its employees to keep their 
smartphones safe and secure. Organizational support goes beyond building awareness; it also includes 
motivating employees and creating effective policies that are understood and easy to follow (Gagne & Deci, 
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2005; Pitichat, 2013). Organizational factors include response cost and top-management participation. 
Response cost is the cost to the employee of performing the recommended behavior (Rogers, 1983). In this 
context, it refers to the effort, overheads, and time required to comply with the organization’s policy on using 
smartphones securely (Xiao et al., 2016). By providing support, organizations can reduce the response cost 
associated with using smartphones securely. We argue that response cost has a significant impact on 
employees’ behavioral intention and their actual smartphone-security compliance. Therefore:  
H3. Response cost affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security compliance.  
H4. Response cost affects employees’ actual smartphone-security compliance.  
4.2.2 Top-management participation 
The second organizational factor is top-management participation, which emerged in the management and 
organizational culture model developed by Hu et al. (2012). Top management play a critical role in managing 
information security and creating an organizational culture that encourages employees to keep their 
smartphones secure. Top managers influence employees’ beliefs, which include their attitudinal, normative, 
and control beliefs (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Soomro et al., 2016). Employees’ own behavior may be 
influenced by their perceptions of top managers’ behavior and actions in facilitating organizational actions 
(Liang & Xue, 2010). It can act as an important determinant of their behavioral intention and actual 
smartphone security compliance behavior. Thus: 
H5. Top-management participation affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security 
compliance.  
H6. Top-management participation affects employees’ actual smartphone-security compliance.  
4.3 Technological (smartphone-specific) factors 
4.3.1 Technology (smartphone-specific) security threats 
Technological (smartphone-specific) factors are the features that make smartphone security different than 
that of other devices, such as laptops and iPads. A smartphone can store personal data and business data, 
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including customer data (Olalere, Abdullah, Mahmod & Abdullah, 2015). The security threats that are 
specific to smartphones are associated with the device itself, its operating system, and the mobile applications 
that can be accessed through it. Smartphones are prone to particular security threats. These include losing the 
device, theft of personal and corporate data, phishing attacks1, spyware attacks2, financial malware attacks3, 
third-party mobile applications4, and attacks associated with the smartphone network (Murray, 2014). The 
Apple App Store for iOS and the Google Play Store for Android are the two largest distribution channels for 
mobile applications, but other vendors also develop and manage applications (Wandera, 2018c). This 
provides more opportunity for attacks and increases security threats. Such threats can create a sense of 
urgency that increases compliance. Thus: 
H7. Technology (smartphone-specific) security threats affect employees’ behavioral intention toward 
smartphone-security compliance. 
4.4 Personal Factors 
Personal factors refer to the personal characteristics of each employee. In our proposed model, these factors 
include: the employee’s attitude, behavioral intention, subjective norms, self-efficacy, perceived risk 
vulnerability, and perceived response efficacy, perceptions of the severity and certainty of sanctions. We 
omitted the factor severity of the adverse consequences, which is used in protection motivation theory and 
refers to one’s perception of the level of damage which may result from engaging in risky situations (Rogers, 
1983). Previous studies found that this factor did not have a significant effect on behavioral intention (Ifinedo, 
2012; Moody, Siponen & Pahnila, 2018; Salleh et al., 2012). Some of these studies identified an overlap 
between this factor and perceived risk vulnerability in that both factors represent a risk to the employee 
(Ifinedo, 2012; Moody et al., 2018; Nyre & Jaatun, 2013). Blythe Coventry and Little (2015) and Ifinedo 
(2012) attributed this overlap to differences in the conceptualization of severity in previous studies. That is, 
                                                          
1 Phishing attacks occur when an attacker collects user credentials (such as passwords and credit card numbers) through fake 
mobile applications or through SMS or email messages that seem genuine (Murray, 2014; Shing et al., 2016). 
2 Spyware covers untargeted collection of personal information as opposed to targeted surveillance (Murray, 2014; Shing et al., 
2016). 
3 Financial malware attacks occur when a smartphone is infected with programs designed for stealing credit card numbers, 
stealing online banking credentials, or subverting online banking or ecommerce transactions (Murray, 2014; Shing et al., 2016). 
4 Third-party mobile applications are mobile applications that are created by a vendor that is not the manufacturer of the device 
or its operating system (Wandera, 2018c).  
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perceived severity is not one overall construct but may comprise several implications (Blythe et al., 2015). 
Within the context of this study, one of these implications is the severity of sanctions received for 
noncompliance. Furthermore, severity of the adverse consequences does not play a role in all security 
behaviors (Moody et al., 2018). Hence, we focused on perceived risk vulnerability and perceived severity of 
sanctions (Moody et al., 2018; Nyre & Jaatun, 2013). 
4.4.1 Attitude  
Attitude refers to a person’s belief that behaving in a certain way leads to specific outcomes and the person’s 
evaluation of those outcomes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Within the context of smartphone-security 
compliance, attitude refers to the employee’s view on whether the behavior is safe, unsafe, risky, or less risky 
(Pattinson et al., 2016). According to the theory of reasoned action, a person’s attitude toward a certain 
behavior has a positive association with their intended behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Indeed, a positive 
attitude toward security is as important as having secure technology in place (Ismail, 2018). The belief that 
a security behavior (for example, keeping personal information secure) leads to positive outcomes may differ 
among employees according to their national culture. Hence, if an employee works in a country where there 
is more awareness of cybersecurity, and where national cybersecurity policies are more advanced, that 
employee is more likely to believe that they should behave in a way that maintains smartphone security and 
minimizes risks. Therefore, a positive attitude toward smartphone security can have a positive influence on 
an employee’s intention to comply. Thus: 
H8. Attitude affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security compliance.  
4.4.2 Perceived self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy refers to the individual’s belief in their ability to perform a particular task (Rogers, 1983; Salleh 
et al., 2012). When an individual believes that they have the skills needed to do a task, they will take the 
necessary action (Lee, Larose & Rifon, 2008) and make extra effort to ensure the security of the system 
(Workman, Bommer & Straub, 2008). Self-efficacy, which is part of coping appraisal, is a significant 
predictor of security behavior because it is linked to the individual’s confidence in performing that behavior 
(Hanus & Wu, 2016; van Bavel et al., 2019). Within social cognitive theory, it is an important determinant 
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of behavioral intention because it enables an individual to regulate their own behavioral intention (Rhee, Kim 
& Ryu, 2009). Education and training can increase a person’s self-efficacy by improving their awareness of 
what to do to prevent or mitigate a security threat. Most countries with cybersecurity policies that aim to 
protect personal information also provide programs to improve awareness and knowledge (CTIA, 2018). In 
other words, in those countries the national culture supports people to keep their smartphones and other 
devices secure. Therefore, citizens of these countries are more likely to have confidence in their ability to 
protect their smartphones. Hence, self-efficacy can have a significant effect on employees’ smartphone-
security behavior, but this may vary according to the level of cybersecurity awareness in their country. This 
is because of the educational programs and awareness campaigns which employees can be exposed to in a 
more cybersecurity advanced country. This enables them to increase their self-confidence in their ability to 
keep their smartphones secure. Thus:  
H9. Perceived self-efficacy affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security compliance.  
4.4.3 Subjective norms 
Subjective norms refer to a person’s belief that specific individuals or groups think that the person should or 
should not behave in a certain way, and to the person’s motivation to comply with those views (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980). Researchers have used this factor to study people’s interaction with smartphones and mobile 
applications (Ameen, 2017; Ameen & Willis, 2018a). In the context of our study, subjective norms refer to 
employees’ perceptions of their managers’ and colleagues’ opinions on smartphone security and the measures 
that should be taken. Subjective norms are also linked to the society and national culture within which the 
company operates. For example, in collectivistic cultures such as the culture in the UAE, individuals are 
more influenced by the opinions, recommendations, and suggestions of others (Abbasi, Tarhini, Elyas, & 
Shah, 2015). In individualistic cultures such as the culture in the UK, on the other hand, individuals focus on 
their own perceptions and are usually less influenced by the opinions of others (Abbasi et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the significance of subjective norms—the opinions of others on BYOD (smartphone) security—
may differ according to the level of collectivism in the country where the employee works. Subjective norms 
can have a significant effect on an employee’s intention to comply with BYOD (smartphone) security in their 
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organization because they can be influenced by the opinions and recommendations of others around them. In 
summary, the significance of subjective norms can vary according to the employee’s organizational culture, 
their national culture, and across different cultures in different countries. Therefore:  
H10. Subjective norms affect employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security compliance.  
4.4.4 Perceived risk vulnerability 
Perceived risk vulnerability is a person’s perception that they will experience negative consequences for 
behaving in a risky way (Rogers, 1983; Salleh et al., 2012). It also refers to how likely they perceive a security 
threat to be (Verkijika, 2018) and whether they perceive their device as susceptible to particular threats 
(Hanus & Wu, 2016). Within the context of smartphone security, perceived risk vulnerability refers to the 
likelihood that a smartphone is prone to a security threat (Verkijika, 2018). It also refers to the employee’s 
belief that an unwanted incident will happen if they do not act to prevent it—which in turn affects security 
(Vance et al., 2012). In countries with a high level of cybersecurity awareness, individuals are more aware 
of the negative consequences of risky behavior. Therefore, the significance of this factor may be modified 
by national cybersecurity awareness, so it may differ in different countries. This factor contributes to a more 
proactive approach to smartphone security because it can lead to employees preventing threats before they 
happen. Thus:  
H11. Perceived risk vulnerability affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security 
compliance.  
4.4.5 Perceived response efficacy 
Perceived response efficacy is the degree to which an individual believes that their response to a threat will 
alleviate it (Rogers, 1983). It focuses on the individual’s belief in the effectiveness of the action that they 
take (Ifinedo, 2012; Rogers, 1983). Previous studies have shown that perceived response efficacy has a 
significant positive influence on information-security intentions (e.g. Doane et al., 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Tsai 
et al., 2016). This factor is linked with employees’ knowledge and awareness of the recommended action or 
behavior. In countries with a high level of national cybersecurity awareness, employees are more aware of 
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which action to take and, in turn, they are more likely to believe that the response will be effective. An 
employee who believes that their action is likely to reveal or reduce a threat to their smartphone (and the data 
stored in it) is more likely to intend to comply with their organization’s smartphone-security policies. 
Therefore:  
H12. Perceived response efficacy affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security 
compliance.  
4.4.6 Perceived severity of sanctions 
Perceived severity of sanctions refers to how serious a person thinks the penalties for noncompliance will be. 
In other words, it refers to an individual’s belief that their deviant behavior will or will not be harshly 
punished (Cheng, Sims & Teegen, 2014). In the context of information security, an organization may penalize 
an employee for behavior that results in a security breach (Herath & Rao, 2009b). The more severe the 
individual thinks the punishment will be, the stronger their intention to comply (Siponen et al., 2010; Vance 
et al., 2012) and the weaker their intention to behave in an undesirable way (Peace et al., 2003). The severity 
of penalties issued by organizations may differ among countries. For example, in countries where 
organizations can be penalized for a data breach by law, organizations may issue severe penalties to the 
employees who are responsible (for example, terminating their employment). Thus:  
H13. Perceived severity of sanctions affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security 
compliance.  
4.4.7 Perceived certainty of sanctions 
Perceived certainty of sanctions refers to how certain a person is that they will face a penalty for not behaving 
in the desired way (D’Arcy & Herath, 2009). In other words, it refers to how certain they are that they will 
be caught (Cheng et al., 2014) and punished by their organization (Herath & Rao, 2009b). When 
organizations make it clear that they will punish employees for security breaches caused by behaving 
inappropriately or misusing their device, their employees are more likely to intend to use their smartphones 
securely. The probability of being caught and punished has been identified as one of the most important 
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factors in criminology research (Cheng, Sims & Teegen, 1997; Herath & Rao, 2009b). Merhi and Ahluwalia 
(2019) explain that in information-security research, certainty refers to certainty of punishment and, more 
likely, certainty of detection. This factor is important is possibly more important in countries where there is 
a high level of cybersecurity awareness. When employees are certain that they will be punished due to a risky 
behavior that can affect the security of their BYOD (smartphone), they become more careful in terms of 
keeping their smartphones secure. Thus:  
H14. Perceived certainty of sanctions affects employees’ behavioral intention toward smartphone-security 
compliance.  
4.4.8 Behavioral intention 
Intention refers to the individual’s mental readiness to behave in a certain way. Accordingly, how a person 
actually behaves depends on their intention (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Research by Ameen et al. (2018) has 
found that this factor is significant in individuals’ decision-making processes within the context of 
information technology. Other studies have found that the intention to behave in a way that promotes 
information security has a significant impact on individuals’ actual compliance (e.g. Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan, 2015; Ifinedo, 2012; Tsai et al., 2016; Vance et al., 2012; Verkijika, 2018). Therefore:  
H15. Behavioral intention affects employees’ actual smartphone-security compliance.  
5.  Methodology and Data  
5.1 Measures 
We used multiple items to measure each factor. For each item we used a seven-point Likert scale with anchors 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. An exception to this was the factor technological 
(smartphone-specific) security threats. For this construct, we asked the respondents to rank several 
smartphone-security threats using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “extremely low” to “extremely 
high”.  
To increase validity, we adopted most of the measurement items from previous studies. We adopted the items 
for response cost and perceived response efficacy from Vance et al’s. (2012) study. To measure perceived 
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risk vulnerability, we used the items from Putri and Hovav’s (2014) study. We measured self-efficacy using 
three items from Herath and Rao’s (2009b) study. To measure attitude, intention, and subjective norms, we 
adopted other items from Herath and Rao’s (2009b) study; however, we modified some of these items to fit 
the context of this study. We adopted the items for perceived severity of sanctions and perceived certainty of 
sanctions from studies conducted by Herath and Rao (2009b), Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford (2005), and 
Peace et al. (2003). To measure the factor national smartphone cybersecurity policies, we adopted items from 
studies by Ameen (2017), Ameen and Willis (2018a), and Loch, Straub and Kamel (2003) and modified them 
to fit the context of national smartphone cybersecurity. We adopted the items for smartphone-specific 
security threats from recent studies on smartphone-security threats (Dimensional Research, 2017; Tu and 
Yuan, 2015). We adopted the items for actual behavior from Siponen et al. (2010). To ensure the validity of 
our research instrument, we carried out a pilot study by sending 30 questionnaires to employees in the UAE. 
We found no reliability or validity issues. Appendix A shows the final version of the measurement items 
used. 
5.2 Data Collection-The Gen-Mobile Workforce 
Previous studies have focused on the security of BYOD technology, including smartphones, tablets, laptops, 
and USB drives (Baillette et al., 2018; Tu & Yuan 2015; Vignesh & Asha, 2015; Zahadat, Blessner, 
Blackburn & Olson, 2015). However, research is lacking on cybersecurity issues associated with smartphone 
use by Gen-Mobile employees in international organizations, especially younger members of the Gen-Mobile 
workforce. Gen-Mobile employees are aged 18-35 and are heavy adopters of smartphones, which they use 
for work purposes (Aruba Networks, 2014). This generation of employees is making work life more flexible, 
with faster communication and greater reach. Despite the prevalence and benefits of using smartphones for 
work purposes, a report by the renowned Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC) reveals that less 
than half of the companies in the US and UK are prepared for cybersecurity attacks (CNBC, 2017). A recent 
report in the US suggests that the BYOD market will reach nearly US$367 billion by 2022 (up from just 
US$30 billion in 2014) and that 59 percent of organizations allow employees to use their own devices for 
work (Lazar, 2017). The US is the world’s biggest cybercrime hotspot, and companies in the country are no 
exception (Business Insider, 2017). In the UAE, 60 percent of the workforce works remotely every week 
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(Khaleej Times, 2018). According to Aruba Networks (2016), the UAE’s Gen-Mobile employees are far 
more willing to share company data and are notably oblivious towards security.  In 2015 the UAE was ranked 
19th in the world for online infection risk, positioning it as a high risk country, and 53 percent of these 
infections came from local threats (Albawaba Business, 2015). This highlights the importance of ensuring 
smartphone-security compliance among UAE employees. 
Available data shows that 95 percent of UK businesses struggle to secure mobile working, and a third of 
them experience data loss or data breach (Response Source, 2018). Half of UK employers believe that 
employees’ security behavior is a major threat to their company (Fadilpašić, 2017). In addition, recent 
research has found that a quarter of senior managers and nearly a third of directors in the UK use their 
smartphones for personal and work purposes (Munarriz, 2018). In total, 14 million people in the UK use their 
smartphones for work purposes (Munarriz, 2018). However, only 54 percent of organizations in the UK have 
adopted formal BYOD policies (Jay, 2018). The UK is one of the ten biggest cybercrime hotspots in the 
world (Business Insider, 2017). It has the most breaches in Europe, with, 43 per cent of businesses reporting 
cyberattacks in 2017 (Vaidya, 2018). In spite of this fact, the IT security spend in the UK remains low 
compared with its EU counterparts (Thalese Security, 2018). Table 4 shows how the US, the UK, and the 
UAE rank according to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2018).  
Table 4. US, UK, and UAE: Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
Country 
Power 





US 40 91 62 46 26 68 
UK 35 89 66 35 51 69 
UAE 90 25 50 80 -* -* 
Source: Hofstede, 2018 
Note: *data from the UAE was not available. 
 
We selected the three countries in this study for the following reasons. First, they rank differently in the 
Global Cyber-Security Index, which helps reveal how the proposed model fits in different countries with 
different cybersecurity environments. Second, they contain a large number of global organizations. Third, 
they rank differently according to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, which allows us to investigate employees’ 
behavior in different organizational settings. To achieve the aim of this study, we collected data from 
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employees within the Gen-Mobile workforce (aged 18-35) who were working for international 
companies, owned a smartphone, and had mobility in their approach to work. The companies were 
in several different industries. We targeted employees in the UK (London), the US (Boston), and 
the UAE (Dubai). Furthermore, the participants worked for international businesses in different 
industries in these countries.  
5.3 Sampling and Data Screening 
We adopted purposive sampling in this research. Using this method enabled us to collect data from 
participants in the target age group who worked for international companies. Purposive sampling was 
effective in previous studies within the information systems domain and with target samples who had certain 
characteristics (Abdel‐Wahab, 2008; Ndubisi, 2006). The participants are chosen based on their possession 
of certain qualities (Etikan, Musa & Alkassim. 2016). That is, they must meet certain criteria in order to be 
selected (Etikan et al., 2016). Hence, it is different from convenience sampling, in which the participants are 
selected based on their availability at a given time (Dörnyei, 2007). Purposive sampling is suitable for both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques (Tongco, 2007). We used two criteria to select the participants. They 
had to be: (1) aged 18-35 (in the Gen-Mobile workforce); and (2) employees of international companies. 
Using this purposive sampling method, we distributed 650 questionnaires to participants face to face in 
London, Boston, and Dubai. We received 579 completed questionnaires from the respondents in the UK, 602 
in the US, and 554 in the UAE. The response rate was 89 percent in the UK, 93 percent in the US, and 85 
percent in the UAE. Distributing the questionnaires face to face helped us to achieve these high response 
rates. 
We screened the completed responses to ensure that no issues could affect the analysis and the results. To do 
so, we assessed the data for common method variance and normality issues using the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003, p. 879) define 
common method variance as “Variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the 
construct the measures represent”. This exaggerates the relationships in the theoretical model. Because this 
study is quantitative and common method variance can be a problem in self-reported studies, we also 
conducted a Harman’s test. The results did not reveal any issues. To assess for normality, we used the 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Shapiro-Wilks test. When skewness and kurtosis are present, it can be 
assumed that the data are not normally distributed. Some researchers assume that values greater than 3.0 
indicate that the data are extremely skewed (Kline, 2005). Our analysis showed that the collected data in the 
three countries were not normally distributed.  
6.  Data Analysis and Results 
We collected data on demographic factors, such as the respondents’ age, gender, and industry type. We also 
asked the respondents whether they were aware of any BYOD policies in their country. We analyzed the data 
using PLS-SEM (Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Gudergan, 2017). This method has been used in other studies on 
information systems and decision-making (e.g. Warkentin, Goel & Menard, 2013; Wu et al., 2014). In 
addition, PLS-SEM is suitable when the data are not normally distributed (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015; 
Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics, 2009), as is the case in our study. Furthermore, when used with complex 
models PLS-SEM is more effective than covariance-based structural equation modelling (CB-SEM) (Hair, 
Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Therefore, PLS-SEM was justified by the complexity of the model (due to 
the number of factors included) and the fact that the data are not normally distributed. We conducted the 
analysis in two stages, assessing the measurement model and then the structural model. We conducted a 
separate analysis for each country. We present the results in the following sections.  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics  
For the UK sample, 44 percent of the respondents were aged 18-22, and 56 percent were aged 23-35. Forty-
one percent of the respondents were male, while 59 percent were female. The respondents worked in the 
following industries: automotive (24%), finance (20%), transport (16%), construction (14%), health (11%), 
utilities (10%), and media (4%). Three respondents did not indicate the industry they worked in. All the 
respondents were aware of the GDPR and national cybersecurity policies on smartphone use in the UK. They 
all used their personal smartphones for work purposes. For the US sample, 49 percent of the respondents 
were aged 18-22, and 51 percent were aged 23-35. Forty-two percent were male and 58 percent were female. 
The respondents worked in the following industries: finance (15%), transport (15%), construction (14%), 
automotive (13%), health (11%), manufacturing (11%), education (9%), utilities (7%), and media (4%). Five 
respondents did not indicate the industry they worked in. Almost all (99%) the respondents were aware of 
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national cybersecurity policies in the US. They were all aware of the GDPR and they all used their personal 
smartphones for work purposes. For the UAE sample, 41 percent of the respondents were aged 18-22, while 
59 percent were aged 23-35. Most of the respondents (79%) were male and 21 percent were female. The 
respondents worked in the following industries: finance (34%), utilities (25%), automotive (24%), education 
(11%), and media (4%). Forty-five percent of the respondents were aware of national cybersecurity policies 
in the UAE, and 80 percent were aware of the GDPR. All the respondents used their personal smartphones 
for work purposes. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for all three samples. 





















































































































6.2 Measurement Model 
We tested the measurement model by assessing its reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity 




Table 6. Reliability and validity assessments: UK, US, and UAE samples 

























AC 0.848 0.908 0.766 0.727 0.844 0.644 0.874 0.941 0.888 
ATT 0.754 0.858 0.669 0.808 0.886 0.721 0.679 0.861 0.756 
INT 0.809 0.887 0.723 0.717 0.841 0.638 0.867 0.919 0.790 
NSCP 0.874 0.914 0.726 0.770 0.866 0.684 0.808 0.887 0.723 
PCS 0.798 0.906 0.829 0.859 0.910 0.772 0.873 0.922 0.798 
PSS 0.801 0.883 0.715 0.825 0.917 0.847 0.861 0.935 0.878 
PV 0.762 0.863 0.677 0.680 0.859 0.753 0.870 0.920 0.794 
RC 0.663 0.814 0.593 0.838 0.887 0.663 0.853 0.931 0.872 
RE 0.680 0.814 0.594 0.845 0.888 0.613 0.861 0.900 0.644 
SE 0.730 0.846 0.648 0.798 0.905 0.827 0.677 0.860 0.754 
SN 0.783 0.873 0.697 0.811 0.913 0.841 0.833 0.900 0.750 
SSF 0.867 0.904 0.653 0.893 0.918 0.693 0.894 0.934 0.826 
TMP 0.791 0.905 0.827 0.832 0.898 0.747 0.793 0.906 0.829 
Note: AC = Actual smartphone security compliance behavior; ATT = Attitude; INT = Behavioral intention; NSCP = National smartphone cybersecurity policies; 
PCS = Perceived certainty of sanctions; PSS = Perceived severity of sanctions; PV = Perceived risk vulnerability; RC = Perceived response cost; RE = Perceived 
response efficacy; SE = Self-efficacy; SN = Subjective norms; SSF = Smartphone-specific security threats; TMP = Top-management participation. 
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We assessed the reliability and convergent validity of the measurement model in the UK, US, and UAE 
samples (see Table 6). All the AVE values for all three samples are higher than the threshold value of 0.5 
(Hair et al., 2017). In addition, the Cronbach’s alpha values for most of the measurement items are higher 
than 0.7 (Hair et al., 2017). Exceptions are RC (0.663) and RE (0.680) in the UK sample, PV (0.680) in the 
US sample, and ATT (0.679) and SE (0.677) in the UAE sample. These values are only slightly lower than 
0.7, hence we kept them. There are no issues in terms of factor loadings. In addition, all composite reliability 
values are higher than the threshold of 0.7 in all three samples (Hair et al., 2014; Hair et al., 2017). We 
assessed discriminant validity in the three samples by using the Fornell-Larcker criterion. The results show 
that the constructs share more variance with their own indicators than they share with the indicators of the 
other constructs, so there are no issues in terms of discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2014). Our assessment 
of the cross-loadings shows that each construct loads higher on its own indicators than on the indicators of 
the other constructs. Some of the factor loadings are lower than the threshold value of 0.7 (Hair et al., 2014). 
Hence, we deleted these items. We assessed collinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF) with a 
threshold value of 5 (Hair et al., 2014). All VIF values are lower than the threshold value of 5. We used these 
VIF values to assess multicollinearity. All VIF inner values are lower than 5. 
6.3 Structural Model 
To test the structural model, we assessed the significance and magnitude of the hypothesized relationships 
by following the bootstrapping procedure in PLS (Hair et al., 2014).  Table 7 summarizes the results of the 
assessment for all three samples.
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Table 7. Hypotheses testing: UK, US, and UAE samples 
  UK US UAE 
Hypothesis Relationship 
T statistic 
(|O/STDEV|) p value Result 
T statistic 
(|O/STDEV|) p value Result 
T statistic 
(|O/STDEV|) p value Result 
H1 NSCP -> INT 0.534 0.593 Not supported 4.365 0.000 Supported 3.748 0.000 Supported 
H2 NSCP -> AC 2.673 0.008 Supported 1.108 0.268 Not supported 2.577 0.010 Supported 
H3 RC -> INT 1.872 0.062 Not supported 1.974 0.047 Supported 8.310 0.000 Supported 
H4 RC -> AC 3.901 0.000 Supported 1.592 0.112 Not supported 6.078 0.000 Supported 
H5 TMP -> INT 3.218 0.001 Supported  3.669 0.000 Supported 5.193 0.000 Supported 
H6 TMP -> AC 0.600 0.549 Not supported 2.035 0.042 Supported 2.701 0.007 Supported 
H7 SSF -> INT 0.911 0.363 Not supported 1.400 0.162 Not supported 7.515 0.000 Supported 
H8 ATT -> INT 2.343 0.020 Supported  3.943 0.000 Supported 3.844 0.000 Supported 
H9 SE -> INT 1.990 0.047 Supported 1.163 0.245 Not supported 1.450 0.148 Not supported 
H10 SN -> INT 2.884 0.004 Supported 0.124 0.901 Not supported 2.467 0.014 Supported 
H11 PV -> INT 4.500 0.000 Supported 0.845 0.399 Not supported 1.372 0.171 Not supported 
H12 RE -> INT 1.731 0.084 Not supported 1.971 0.049 Supported 1.554 0.121 Not supported 
H13 PSS -> INT 9.684 0.000 Supported 0.762 0.447 Not supported 0.601 0.548 Not supported 
H14 PCS -> INT 0.962 0.337 Not supported 2.274 0.023 Supported 11.608 0.000 Supported 





For the UK sample, H2 (p value=0.008), H4 (p value=0.000), H5 (p value=0.001), H8 (p value=0.020), H9 
(p value=0.047), H10 (p value=0.004), H11(p value=0.000), H13 (p value=0.000), and H15 (p value=0.000) 
are supported. H1 (p value=0.593), H3 (p value=0.062), H6 (p value=549), H7 (p value=363), H12 (p 
value=0.084), and H14 (p value=0.337) are not supported because their p values are greater than 0.05 (Hair 
et al., 2017). For the US sample, H1 (p value=0.000), H3 (p value=0.047), H5 (p value=0.000), H6 (p 
value=0.042), H8 (p value=0.000), H12 (p value=0.049), H14 (p value=0.023), and H15 (p value=0.023) are 
supported. H2 (p value=0.268), H4 (p value=0.112), H7 (p value=0.162), H9 (p value=0.245), H10 (p 
value=0.901), H11 (p value=0.399), and H13 (p value=0.447) are not supported. For the UAE sample, H1 (p 
value=0.000), H2 (p value=0.010), H3 (p value=0.000), H4 (p value=0.000), H5 (p value=0.000), H6 (p 
value=0.007), H7 (p value=0.000), H8 (p value=0.000), H10 (p value=0.014), H14 (p value=0.000), and H15 
(p value=0.001) are supported. H9 (p value=0.148), H11 (p value=171), H12 (p value=0.121), and H13 (p 
value=0.548) are not supported. 
The results show that the model can explain 67 percent (R2=0.667) of behavioral intention and 40 percent 
(R2=0.398) of actual smartphone-security compliance among employees in the UK. It can explain 79 percent 
(R2=0.794) of behavioral intention and 57 percent (R2=0.571) of actual smartphone-security compliance 
among employees in the US. In the UAE, it can explain 83 percent (R2=0.832) of behavioral intention and 
58 percent (R2=0.578) of actual smartphone-security compliance. The model’s explanatory power is highest 
in the UAE. 
6.4 Multi-Group Analysis 
To test the differences across all three samples, we used partial least squares-multi group analysis (PLS-
MGA). This nonparametric method of analysis, introduced by Henseler et al. (2009), tests the differences 
between the path coefficients of two groups (Henseler et al., 2009; Sarstedt, Henseler & Ringle, 2011). PLS-
MGA directly compares group-specific bootstrap estimates from each bootstrap sample. A p value of the 
difference between the path coefficients lower than 0.05 or higher than 0.95 at the 5 percent level indicates 
that there are significant differences between specific path coefficients across two groups (Henseler et al., 
2009; Sarstedt et al., 2011). We compared the groups in pairs (UK vs US, UAE vs UK, and US vs UAE).  
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The results of the PLS-MGA analysis (Table 8) support the differences in path significance between the three 
samples included in the study.  
Table 8. Multi-group analysis across samples 




difference p value  
Path 
coefficients: 
difference  p value  
Path 
coefficients: 
difference  p value  
H1 NSCP -> INT 0.287 1.000 0.151 0.000 0.136 0.019 
H2 NSCP -> AC 0.012 0.572 0.172 0.039 0.160 0.950 
H3 RC -> INT 0.121 0.051 0.287 0.091 0.166 0.999 
H4 RC -> AC 0.085 0.098 0.266 0.000 0.351 1.000 
H5 TMP -> INT 0.081 0.948 0.049 0.091 0.032 0.252 
H6 TMP -> AC 0.061 0.834 0.071 0.188 0.010 0.541 
H7 SSF -> INT 0.027 0.311 0.216 0.218 0.244 1.000 
H8 ATT -> INT 0.154 0.998 0.115 0.991 0.269 0.999 
H9 SE -> INT 0.019 0.375 0.113 0.991 0.094 0.072 
H10 SN -> INT 0.098 0.025 0.151 0.952 0.047 0.868 
H11 PV -> INT 0.143 0.011 0.145 0.998 0.001 0.507 
H12 RE -> INT 0.099 0.975 0.080 0.019 0.019 0.352 
H13 PSS -> INT 0.387 0.072 0.351 0.330 0.082 0.055 
H14 PCS -> INT 0.066 0.160 0.469 0.998 0.417 0.996 
H15 INT -> AC 0.341 0.330 0.780 0.999 0.439 0.000 
Note: p values in bold indicate a significant difference 
 
There are significant differences between all three samples for H1 (NSCP -> INT). For H2 (NSCP -> AC), 
there are significant differences between the UAE and UK, and between the US and the UAE. For H3 (RC -
> INT), there are significant differences between the UK and US, and between the US and the UAE. For H4 
(RC -> AC), there are significant differences between the UAE and UK, and between the US and the UAE. 
There are no significant differences between the samples for H5 (TMP -> INT) and H6 (TMP -> AC). For 
H7 (SSF -> INT), there are significant differences between the US and the UAE. For H8 (ATT -> INT), there 
are significant differences among all three samples. For H9 (SE -> INT), there are significant differences 
between the UAE and the UK. For H10 (SN -> INT), there are significant differences between the UK and 
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the US, and between the UAE and the UK. For H11 (PV -> INT) and H12 (RE -> INT), there are significant 
differences between the UK and the US, and between the UAE and the UK. There are no significant 
differences between the samples for H13 (PSS -> INT). For both H14 (PCS -> INT) and H15 (INT -> AC), 
there are significant differences between the UAE and the UK, and between the US and the UAE. Overall, 
the PLS-MGA analysis confirms the differences in the structural model in each separate country. Therefore, 
the results show that there are significant differences between the samples.  
7. Discussion 
This study deepens our understanding of how employees’ information-security compliance behavior is 
influenced by national cybersecurity policies and security threats that are specific to smartphones. It proposes 
the holistic ESSC model, which accounts for national, organizational, technological (smartphone-specific) 
and personal factors. To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to investigate the effects of 
national cybersecurity policies and smartphone-specific security threats on employees’ smartphone-security 
compliance in a cross-cultural context. In doing so it fills a gap in the literature, which has mainly focused 
on the organizational context. Our findings show that employees’ behavior is influenced by not only their 
personalities and their organizations but also national cybersecurity policies and security threats that are 
specific to smartphones. In addition, our findings reveal that there are differences in employees’ smartphone-
security behavior in the UK, the US, and the UAE. National cybersecurity policies have significant effects 
on behavioral intention (H1) among employees in both the US and the UAE, but not in the UK. They have a 
significant effect on actual smartphone-security compliance (H2) among employees in the UK and the UAE. 
However, almost half of employees surveyed in the UAE are not aware of national policies that are specific 
to BYOD security; they are aware of the GDPR only. Because BYODs are used within and outside 
organizations for personal and work purposes, their secure use is covered by policies and regulations beyond 
the organizational context. Laws and regulations such as the GDPR in Europe require companies to report 
all suspected security breaches, which puts pressure on companies and their employees, influencing their 
behavior. Our findings suggest that employees in all three countries are aware of the impact of these laws 
and regulations on smartphone security and how they affect the secure use of these devices. This factor is 
particularly important for employees in the UAE because it has a significant effect on their behavioral 
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intention and their actual smartphone-security compliance. National cybersecurity policies differ among 
countries and national advances in cybersecurity. However, they have a significant influence on employees’ 
smartphone-security compliance. These findings show that national policies do not only affect the adoption 
of smartphones as indicated in Ameen et al.’s (2018) study but they also affect post-adoption issues, more 
specifically, smartphone security behavior.  
Response cost has a significant effect on behavioral intention (H3) in the US and the UAE, but not in the 
UK. However, this factor has a significant effect on actual smartphone security compliance (H4) in the UK 
and the UAE, but not in the US. Employees in the UK and the UAE consider the amount of effort and time 
they need to put in to ensure smartphone security as an important factor. This is consistent with the findings 
of studies conducted by Rogers (1983) and Xiao et al. (2016). Surprisingly, employees in the US are not 
concerned with how much time or effort they need to invest to keep their smartphones secure. In addition, 
support from the top management has a significant effect on behavioral intention (H5) among employees in 
all three countries. This is consistent with the findings of Liang et al. (2007) and Hu et al. (2012). Therefore, 
to increase employees’ intention to comply, managers need to articulate a clear vision and strategy for 
smartphone security, and they should establish clear goals and objectives for achieving a high level of 
security. Similarly, this factor has a significant effect on actual smartphone-security compliance (H6) among 
employees in the US and the UAE, but not in the UK. The insignificant effect of support from top managers 
on employees in the UK is surprising. 
It is also surprising that smartphone-specific security threats do not have a significant effect on behavioral 
intention (H7) among employees in the UK or in the US. However, this remains a salient factor in young 
employees’ smartphone-security compliance in the UAE. A possible explanation for these results is that 
employees in the UK and the US are more used to using smartphones; because they are more familiar with 
the related security threats, those threats may have less influence on their intention to comply with 
smartphone-security policies. Employees in the UAE are less aware of the security issues associated with 
using smartphones, as stated in studies by Olalere et al. (2015) and Murray (2014). Examples of threats 
associated with smartphones include the operating system, mobile applications, and cyberattacks (e.g. 
phishing, malware, and spyware) targeted at the device and its applications (Wandera, 2018c). In addition, 
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in all three countries, employees’ attitude to smartphone-security compliance has a significant influence on 
their behavioral intention (H8). This is consistent with the findings of the studies conducted by Ismail (2018) 
and Pattinson et al. (2016). Employees are more likely to want to comply with policies on smartphone 
security if they believe that doing so will benefit them and their organizations. This is strengthened by a 
belief that it is important to enforce their organization’s smartphone-security policies, practices, and use of 
associated technologies. 
Self-efficacy has a significant effect on behavioral intention (H9) among employees in the UK only. Previous 
studies have found that employees make more effort to secure their devices when they have confidence in 
their ability to deal with a security threat (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Salleh, 2012; Workman et al., 2008; van 
Bavel, 2019). Our analysis shows that employees in the US and the UAE lack this confidence; they do not 
feel that they have the skills needed to follow their organization’s smartphone-security policies, and they do 
not feel comfortable with doing so without assistance. Furthermore, subjective norms have a significant effect 
on behavioral intention (H10) among employees in the UK and the UAE, which indicates that they pay 
attention to their colleagues’ opinions on whether they should follow smartphone-security policies. This 
contradicts the findings of the studies conducted by Ameen (2017) and Ameen and Willis (2018a), who found 
that the opinions of others do not affect how people use smartphones. The UK is an individualistic society, 
so our findings also contradict the assumption that employees in individualistic cultures are not influenced 
by other people’s opinions and recommendations.  
Perceived risk vulnerability has a significant effect on behavioral intention (H11) among employees in the 
UK only. This suggests that employees in the UK are aware of the negative consequences that are likely to 
result from using smartphones in a way that puts information security at risk. Meanwhile, employees in the 
US and the UAE are not as aware of the threats that result from using smartphones inappropriately or not 
complying with their organization’s smartphone-security policies. This contradicts the findings of previous 
studies (e.g. Hanus & Wu, 2016; Salleh et al. 2012; Verkijika, 2018). Furthermore, response efficacy has a 
significant effect on behavioral intention (H12) among employees in the US only. This suggests that these 
employees believe that acting in line with their organization’s smartphone-security policies will reduce 
security threats to their companies and themselves. This significant effect is consistent with the findings of 
40 
previous research (e.g. Doane et al., 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Tsai et al., 2016). In addition, perceived severity of 
sanctions has a significant effect on behavioral intention (H13) among employees in the UK only. Employees 
in the US and the UAE do not seem to be affected by the possibility of being penalized by their organizations 
for noncompliance; they assume that the penalties are not severe for using their smartphones in a way that 
may lead to a data breach. This is inconsistent with the findings of Siponen et al. (2010) and Vance et al. 
(2012). In contrast, employees in the UK fear the penalties they may face for behavior that could put their 
organization’s information security at risk. This difference may be associated with the enforcement of the 
GDPR in the UK. Furthermore, perceived certainty of sanctions has a significant effect on behavioral 
intention (H14) among employees in the US and the UAE, but not in the UK. Therefore, for employees in 
the UAE and the US, their view on the likelihood of being caught and punished is an important determinant 
of their intended smartphone-security compliance. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies 
(e.g. Cheng et al., 2014; Herath & Rao, 2009; Merhia & Ahluwalia, 2019). The situation is the opposite for 
employees in the UK, whose behavioral intention is influenced by their perceptions of the severity rather 
than the certainty of the related sanctions. Finally, in all three countries, employees’ intention to comply with 
their organization’s smartphone-security policies has a significant effect on how they actually behave (H15).  
Our findings support the applicability of our proposed holistic model which integrates national, 
organizational, technological (smartphone-specific) and personal factors, despite differences in the 
significance of the factors in a cross-cultural context. The following factors determine employees’ 
smartphone-security compliance in organizations in all three countries: national cybersecurity policies, 
attitude, and top-management participation. Among employees in the UK, the following factors are also 
significant: self-efficacy, subjective norms, response cost, perceived risk vulnerability, and perceived 
severity of sanctions. In the US, the following additional factors are significant: response cost, response 
efficacy, and perceived certainty of sanctions. Finally, in the UAE, significant factors also include response 
cost, technology (smartphone-specific) security threats, subjective norms, and perceived certainty of 
sanctions. This shows the variance in the significance of the determinants of employees’ BYOD security 
compliance. The findings also show that the effects of national factors (national cybersecurity policies) and 
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organizational factors (top management support) remain significant in different countries despite the 
differences in their cybersecurity readiness.  
8. Theoretical and Practical Contributions  
8.2 New Theoretical Contributions  
This study makes three contributions to theory. First, our research serves as the leading effort to understand 
how national cybersecurity policies and BYOD (smartphone) specific security threats affect employees’ 
smartphone-security compliance. This addresses the gap in the literature created by focusing on only the 
individual, organizational, and (more recently) group levels (e.g. Cram et al., 2017; Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan, 2015; Hu et al., 2012; Hwang & Cha, 2018; Janmaimool, 2017; Johnston et al., 2019; Olalere 
et al., 2015; Putri & Hovav, 2014; Salleh et al., 2012; Siponen, 2006; Tu & Yuan, 2015). Furthermore, our 
study is the first to focus on national factors and technology-specific security threats (in this case, threats 
specific to smartphones).  
National policies and advances in cybersecurity vary by country, but our findings suggest that these factors 
have a significant influence on employees’ smartphone-security compliance and the content of associated 
organizational policies. These national level policies also create variance in employees’ behavior. 
Furthermore, security threats that are specific to BYODs (smartphones) have a significant influence on 
employees even if they work in a country that is less advanced in cybersecurity.  
Second, our research responds to calls for an approach that covers all the important aspects of information 
security in organizations (Soomro et al., 2016). Our new theoretical model, the ESSC, combines and extends 
three well-known theories that apply to information-security behavior: protection motivation theory (Rogers, 
1983), general deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1963; Gibbs, 1975), and theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). Our model extends these theories by integrating national cybersecurity policies and BYOD 
(smartphone)-specific security threats. It groups the factors into national, organizational, technological 
(smartphone-specific) and personal categories. This contributes to a better understanding of the main areas 
to consider when studying employees’ smartphone-security compliance. Our findings suggest that future 
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research should also go beyond the individual, group, and organizational phenomena when studying this 
behavior.  
Third, our findings show that a positive attitude among employees, support from top managers, and national 
cybersecurity policies have a significant influence on employees, regardless how advanced a country is in 
cybersecurity. The findings of our cross-cultural study challenge existing theories on information security 
within organizations. Previous studies have reported that the following factors have a significant impact: 
response cost, self-efficacy, subjective norms, perceived risk vulnerability, response efficacy, perceived 
severity of sanctions, and perceived certainty of sanctions (Doane et al., 2016; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Herath 
& Rao, 2009b; Ismail, 2018; Ifinedo, 2012; Rhee et al., 2009; Tsai et al., 2016; Vance et al., 2012). However, 
our findings reveal important differences in the significance of these factors among employees in different 
countries. Therefore, theories on information security should consider these differences.  
8.3 Managerial and Policy Implications  
We have found that there are significant differences in smartphone-security behavior among employees in 
the UK, the US, and the UAE. This is a major challenge for managers in international companies with 
different teams in different countries. Simply having a BYOD cybersecurity policy is not enough; managers 
and policy-makers need to adjust their approach to communicating and implementing the policy in line with 
the needs, skills, and preferences of employees in different regions of the world.  
Managers who support smartphone-security programs and policies are more likely to make employees feel 
motivated to actively ensure that their smartphones and the data that can be accessed through these devices 
are secure. We have found that support from top management and employees’ attitude to smartphone security 
are important factors for smartphone security in all three countries. Our results have major implications for 
policy-makers and company managers who are developing smartphone-security policies. Employees in the 
UAE lack awareness of specific national BYOD security policies rather than lacking awareness of the GDPR 
only. They are less aware of the security threats that are related to using their smartphones. Hence, policy-
makers and managers need to collaborate to develop effective national cybersecurity policies that focus on 
BYODs, especially smartphones, and ensure that employees are aware of the requirements of these policies. 
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This is important because national policies on smartphone security have a significant effect on employees’ 
smartphone-security compliance.  
Managers in organizations in the US and in the UAE should develop training programs and coaching sessions 
to build employees’ confidence and ability in following company policies on smartphone security and dealing 
with related security threats. Our research suggests that employees in these two countries find it difficult to 
follow these policies because they lack self-efficacy. Therefore, improving their knowledge and skills is 
important for ensuring smartphone security and minimizing data breaches. Similarly, managers need to 
develop programs to raise awareness of smartphone security among employees in the US and the UAE. Our 
findings suggest that these employees lack awareness of the threats to information security that are associated 
with using smartphones inappropriately. Programs are needed to educate these employees on the latest trends 
in cyberattacks and how to protect their devices. We found that in general, employees have a positive attitude 
to smartphone security, which suggests that awareness-raising programs will improve their compliance. 
Managers should tailor the programs to suit the preferences and needs of employees in specific countries. 
Such an approach will help to build positive subjective norms on smartphone security, which proved to have 
a strong influence on employees in the UAE and the UK. 
Our results reveal that the introduction of the GDPR has encouraged international organizations to improve 
their measures for keeping business and customer information secure, including on smartphones. The act 
plays an important role in putting pressure on organizations to ensure information security to protect their 
data and their customers’ data. This includes companies in the EU region (for example in the UK) and any 
company outside the EU region (for example in the US and UAE) that targets or deals with this region. 
However, the regulation does not account for human error, which is a major security issue for organizations. 
Our results show that national smartphone cybersecurity policies have a significant effect on behavioral 
intention and actual smartphone-security compliance among employees in all three countries. Therefore, 
managers should continue to emphasize the importance of following these policies. Doing so will raise 
employee awareness of the penalties and other consequences that their organizations may face in the case of 
a data breach. Also, this study has found that response efficacy has no effect on employee compliance in the 
UK or the UAE, which suggests that these employees do not wholly believe that following their 
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organizations’ smartphone-security policies will reduce the threat of information breaches. Therefore, 
organizations operating in the UK or the UAE need to assess the reasons behind this and identify ways to 
improve their smartphone-security policies or communicate the effectiveness of their existing policies to 
employees. Moreover, in the US and UAE, where the mobile workforce is an important employee segment, 
organizations should clarify the likelihood of the information-security threats associated with noncompliant 
use of smartphones.  
9. Limitations and Future Research  
Although this study provides interesting results and insights, it has some limitations. First, it focuses on Gen-
Mobile employees. Future research is needed on older employees, who may use smartphones less extensively 
and may not be as experienced in using them securely. Comparing the results with our findings may identify 
interesting differences. Second, our results show that employees behave differently in the three countries we 
selected. Future research is needed on other countries and compare the findings to the findings of our study. 
Third, our study focused on employees who worked in large international companies in three advanced 
markets: the UK, the US and the UAE. Fourth, while our model provides a holistic overview of employees’ 
mobile security behavior in the three countries by integrating three of the most well-known theories in the 
area of security behavior and it mirrors the complexity of the issue the research attempted to tackle, it includes 
a high number of hypotheses and factors which we have categorized into: national, organizational, 
technological and personal factors. Future studies can focus on the factors proved to have significant effects 
in our study to avoid complexities in developing models on employees’ security behavior. Fifth, our findings 
were based on data collected from employees working in international companies in different industries 
namely: education, utilities, construction, health, finance, transport, automotive, manufacturing and media. 
We believe that collecting data from employees in different industries has had an impact on our results. 
Future studies can focus further on the moderating effects of industry type on employees’ BYOD 
(smartphone) security compliance behavior and industry type-based differences in terms of the impact of the 
GDPR on this behavior.   
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10. Conclusion  
This study represents a pioneering effort in the information-security literature to analyze the effects of 
national, organizational, technological (smartphone-specific), and personal factors in order to deepen the 
understanding of information-security behavior among Gen-Mobile employees in a cross-cultural context. 
The study also contextualizes and validates extant theories on individuals’ information-security behavior by 
combining and extending three widely used theories in this domain (protection motivation theory, general 
deterrence theory, and theory of reasoned action) to develop a new model: the ESSC. The findings show 
interesting variations across the three countries investigated (US, UK, and UAE) in the significance of the 
factors included in the ESSC. Our study reveals important differences in smartphone-security compliance in 
international companies on the national level. Therefore, managers and policy-makers need to take a more 
holistic approach to ensuring smartphone-security compliance among Gen-Mobile employees in different 
countries by focusing on interventions on the national, organizational, technological (smartphone-specific) 
and personal levels. In addition, they should develop more effective smartphone-security policies that 
account for human error and build awareness of these policies among employees. Overall, this study 
contributes to a better understanding of how national cybersecurity policies and smartphone-specific security 
threats influence employees’ information-security compliance behavior.  
Appendix A. Measurement items 
Factor/item Source 
Top management participation Hu et al. (2012) 
TMP1: Senior managers of our company have articulated a clear 
vision about smartphone security. 
 
TMP2: Senior managers of our company have formulated a clear 
strategy for achieving a high degree of smartphone security. 
 
TMP3: Senior managers of our company have established clear goals 
and objectives for achieving a high degree of smartphone security. 
 
Attitude  Herath and Rao (2009b) 
ATT1: I believe that it is beneficial for an organization to establish 
clear smartphone-security policies, practices, and technologies. 
 
ATT2: I believe that it is useful to for an organization to enforce its 
smartphone-security policies, practices, and technologies. 
 
ATT3: I believe that it is a good idea for an organization to establish 
clear smartphone-security policies, practices, and technologies. 
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Subjective norms Herath and Rao (2009b) 
SN1: People who are influential to me would think that I should 
follow the policies and procedures and use the security 
technologies for smartphones. 
 
SN2: People who are important to me would think that I should 
follow the policies and procedures and use the security 
technologies for smartphones. 
 
SN3: People whom I respect would think that I should follow the 
policies and procedures and use the security technologies for 
smartphones. 
 
Behavioral intention Herath and Rao (2009b) 
INT1: I intend to follow the smartphone-security policies and 
practices for using smartphones at work.  
 
INT2: I intend to use the smartphone-security technologies for using 
smartphones at work. 
 
INT3: It is possible that I will comply with organizational 
smartphone-security policies to protect the organization’s 
data.  
 
Self-efficacy  Herath and Rao (2009b) 
SE1: I would feel comfortable following most of the smartphone-
security policies on my own. 
 
SE2: If I wanted to, I could easily follow smartphone-security policies 
on my own. 
 
SE3: I would be able to follow most of the smartphone-security 
policies even if there was no one around to help me. 
 
Perceived risk vulnerability  Putri and Hovav (2014) 
PV1: I could be subjected to an information-security threat, if I don’t 
comply with my organization’s smartphone-security policy.  
 
PV2: A security problem to my organization’s information could 
occur if I don’t comply with my organization’s smartphone-security 
policy.  
 
PV3: A security problem to my personal data could occur if I don’t 
comply with my organization’s smartphone-security policy. 
 
Response cost Vance et al. (2012) 
RC1: Complying with smartphone-security policy interferes with my 
work.  
 
RC2: Complying with smartphone-security policy interferes with the 
personal use on my device.  
 
RC3: There are too many overheads associated with complying with 
smartphone-security policies.  
 
RC4: Complying with smartphone-security policy would require 
considerable investment of effort other than time. 
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RC5: Complying with smartphone-security policy would take 
considerable amount of my working time.  
 
RC6: Complying with smartphone-security policy would take 
considerable amount of my personal time. 
 
Perceived response efficacy  Vance et al. (2012) 
RE1: Complying with smartphone-security policy reduces the 
security threat to my organization’s information. 
 
RE2: Complying with smartphone-security policy reduces the 
security threat to my personal data.  
 
RE3: If I comply with smartphone-security policy, mobile security 
problems in my organization will be scarce.  
 
RE4: If I comply with smartphone-security policy, my mobile device 
related security problems will be scarce. 
 
RE5: Compliance with smartphone-security policy helps to reduce IS 
security problems in my organization. 
 
RE6: Compliance with smartphone-security policy helps me reduce 
security problems with my own personal data. 
 
Perceived severity of sanctions Herath and Rao (2009b); Knapp et al. 
(2005); Peace et al. (2003). 
PSS1: The organization disciplines employees who break 
information-security rules.  
 
PSS2: My organization terminates employees who repeatedly break 
security rules.  
 
PSS3: If I were caught violating organization information-security 
policies, I would be severely punished. 
 
Perceived certainty of sanctions Herath and Rao (2009b); Knapp et al. 
(2005); Peace et al. (2003). 
PCS1: Employee computer practices are properly monitored for 
policy violations. 
 
PCS2: If I violate organization security policies, I would probably be 
caught. 
 
National smartphone cybersecurity policies Ameen (2017); Ameen and Willis 
(2018a); Loch et al. (2003) 
NSCP1: I am aware of the smartphone-security policies in my 
country. 
 
NSCP2: I find the smartphone-security policies in my country 
effective.  
 
NSCP3: I believe the smartphone-security policies in my country 
influence my awareness of smartphone security in my organization. 
 
NSCP4: The Government’s cybersecurity initiatives are working 
well. 
 
Actual smartphone security compliance behavior Siponen et al. (2010); D’Arcy and 
Greene (2014) 
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AC1: I comply with smartphone-security recommendations  
AC2: I do my best to strictly follow smartphone security rules and 
procedures 
 
AC3: I am certain that I will follow organizational smartphone 
security recommendations (if they exist) 
 
Smartphone-specific security threats Dimensional Research (2017); Tu and 
Yuan (2015) 
SSF1: Threat of physical loss of the device  
SSF2: Threats associated with connecting to different networks  
SSF3: Threats associated with using different mobile applications  
SSF4: Threats associated with data breaches   
SSF5: The mixed use of smartphones for personal and business 
purposes 
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